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Summary findings
Wei  reviews the  overwlhelming  statistical  evidence  that  Culture  shapes  the difference  between  a "bribe"  and a
countries  with  high levels of corruption  experience  poor  "gift"  but  culturally  induced  diffcrences  seem  small.
economic  performance.  Corruption  hinders  economic  There  is no evidence  to support  the notioni  that
development  by reducing  domestic  investment,  corruption  in Asia, including  East Asia, entails  lesser
discouraging  foreign  direct  investment,  encouraging  consequences.
overspending  in government,  and  distorting  the  Corruption  can  be symptomatic  of many social  ills so
composition  of government  spending  (away  from  the  fight against  it must  be multifaceted.  Laws and  law
education,  health,  and  infrastructure  maintenance  enforcement  are indispensable,  but  countries  serious
toward  less efficient  but  more  manipulable  public  about  fighting  corruption  should  also  reform
projects).  government's  role in the economy,  especially  in areas
The  World  Bank and  the International  Monetary  that  (by giving officials  discretionary  power)  are hotbeds
Fund,  among  others,  define  corruption  as "the  abuse  of  of corruption.  Recruiting  and promoting  civil servants  On
public  office  for private  gains."  Whenever  a public  office  the basis of merit  and  paying  them  a salary  competitive
is abused,  a public  function  or  objective  is set aside  and  with  similar  jobs in the private  sector  helps  attract  moral,
compromised.  Only  if a public  function  is unproductive  high-quality  civil servants.  International  pressure  on
are policy  goals unharmed  by corruption.  corrupt  countries,  and  also to criminalize  the bribing  of
But one often  hears  that  bribery  greases  the machinery  foreign  officials  by multinationial  firms,  can  be useful.
of commerce,  so Wei  studied  the evidence  - which  But anti-corruptioll  campaigns  cannot  succeed  without
clearly  rejects  that  hypothesis.  reforming  domestic  institutions  in the  corrupt  countries.
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ISummary
This  paper  reviews  the  overwhelming  statistical  evidence  that  countries  with  high
corruption levels have poorer economic performance.  There are several channels through which
corruption hinders economic development.  They include reduced domestic investment, reduced
foreign  direct  investment,  overblown  government  expenditure,  distorted  composition  of
government expenditure away  from education, health,  and the  maintenance of  infrastructure,
towards less efficient but more manipulatable public projects.
A definition of corruption used by the World Bank and the IMF, arnong others, "the abuse
of pubic office for private gains," serves as a backdrop of the discussion. Whenever a public office
is abused, a public function or objective is set aside and compromised.  Only if a public function is
unproductive could it be that policy goals were not harmed by  corruption.  Nevertheless, the
proposition that bribery can grease the machinery of commerce is often heard, and hence deserves a
careful look at the evidence. And the evidence clearly rejects this hypothesis.
While culture plays  a role in determining what is considered a  bribe versus a gift, the
culture-induced difference seems small. There is no evidence to support the notion that corruption
in Asia, East Asia included, has smaller negative consequences.
Corruption could be  a  symptom of many ills  of a  society.  Hence, the  fight against
corruption has to be multi-fronted.  While laws and law enforcement are indispensable, countries
serious about fighting corruption should also pay attention to reforming  the role of government in
the economy, particularly those areas that give officials discretionary power which are hot beds for
corruption.  Recruiting and promoting civil servants on a merit basis, and paying them a  salary
competitive to  private  sector alternatives help to  attract high  quality,  moral  civil  servants.
International pressure on corrupt countries, including criminalizing bribing foreign officials by
multinational firms, is useful.  But the success of any anti-corruption campaign ultimately depends
on the reform of domestic institutions in currently corrupt countries.
2Introduction
"Corruption is like cancer, retarding economic development.]"
"Corruption can be like 'grease,  'speeding up the wheels of commerce.2"
"If corruption does slow down economic development, East Asia  must be  an exception
because while the region seems corrupt, it is able to attract lots offoreign investment and generate
growth. "
These statements about corruption are all read or heard from time to time, and it is probably
feasible to  find  some anecdotes to  support any or  all of these possibly mutually inconsistent
hypotheses. But there is a limit to what anecdotes can tell us.  What does a careful examination of
facts and data tell us?  This paper reviews recent studies on the consequences of corruption on
economic development.
There are some very good survey papers on corruption issues, for example, see Andvig
(1991), Bardhan (1997), Kaufnann  (1997b), UNDP (1997), and Tanzi (1998).  This paper has two
distinctive features. First, it places relatively more emphasis on Asia. Second, wherever possible, it
concentrates on recent evidence based on systematic statistical analyses, including some from not-
yet published studies by this and other authors.
This  paper is  organized in the  following way.  Section 1 discusses how cross-country
difference  in  corruption  may  be  measured.  Section  2  reviews  the  evidence  on  economic
consequences of corruption, with particular attention to  recent empirical research, and with  an
attempt to interpret them in light of the Asian experience. Section 3 discusses the notion of cultural
difference in the consequences of corruption. Section 4 discusses factors that may contribute to the
different extent of corruption in different countries, and possible remedies to the problem.  Section
1 Statement  similar  to the one made by James  Wolfensohn,  President  of the World  Bank, Transition,  7(9-
10),  p9, September/October  1996.
2 Some formnal  theorizing  along  this line can  be found  in Leff (1964),  Huntington  (1968), and Lui
(1985).
35 provides some concluding thoughts.
1. Measuring Corruption
This paper focuses on corruption in the economic sphere involving government officials.
Corruption here is defined as government officials abusing their power to extract/accept bribes from
the private sector for personal benefit3. This is to be distinguished from political corruption (e.g.,
vote-buying in an election, legal or illegal campaign contributions by the wealthy and other special
interest groups to influence laws and regulations), and bribes among private sector parties.
By the very nature of corruption (secrecy, illegality, variations across different economic
activities), it is impossible to obtain precise information on the extent of corruption in a country,
unlike,  for  instance, measuring inflation.  This  difficulty also  precludes a  precise grading of
countries according to their relative degree of corruption.
That said, one can still get useful infornation  on the seriousness of corruption in a country
by surveying experts or firms in that country. Like pornography, corruption is difficult to quantify,
but  you  know it  when you  see  it.  There are several survey-based measures of  "corruption
perception" that are increasingly visible now. I will describe four of them, in part because they
cover relatively wide sample of countries, and in part because they are used in the research studies
that I will review below.
(A) Business International (BI) Index
Business International Index  is  based on  surveys of  experts/consultants (typically one
consultant per country) conducted during 1980-83 by Business International, now a subsidiary of
3 For instance,  the World  Bank defines  corruption  as "the abuse  of public office for private gains"
(World  Bank, "Helping  Countries  Countries  Combat  Corruption:  The Role  of the World  Bank,"
1997).
4the Economist Intelligence Unit. It ranks countries from one to ten, according to "the degree to
which business transactions involve corruption or questionable  payments."
(B) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Index.
Produced  every  year  since  1982  by  Political  Risk  Services,  a  private  international
investment risk service. The ICRG corruption index is apparently based on the opinion of experts
and supposed to capture the extent to which "high government officials are likely to demand specia'
payments"  and to  which  "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower  levels of
government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls,
tax assessments, police protection, or loans."
(C) Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) Index
Unlike the BI  and ICRG indices, the  GCR Index  is based  on a  1996 survey of firm
managers, rather than experts or consultants. Sponsored by the World Economic Forum (WEF), a
Europe-based consortium with a large membership of firms, and designed by the Harvard Institute
for International Development(HIID), this survey asked the responding firms about various aspects
of "competitiveness" in the host countries where they invest. 2381 firms in 58 countries answered
the question on corruption which asked the respondent to rate the level of corruption on a one-to-
seven scale according to the extent of "irregular, additional payments connected with import and
export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loan
applications." The GCR corruption index for a particular country is the average of all respondents'
ratings for that country.
(D) Transparency International (TI) Index
Produced  annually  since  1995  by  Transparency  International,  an  international  non-
governmental organization dedicated to  fight corruption worldwide, the  index  is  based  on  a
weighted average of approximately ten surveys of varying coverage. It ranks countries on a one-to-
5ten scale.
As  a  survey  of  surveys, the TI  index has  its  advantages and  disadvantages.  If  the
measurement errors in  different surveys are independent and  identically distributed  (iid), the
averaging process used to  produce the TI  index may reduce the measurement error.  But  iid
assumption may not hold.  Moreover, since different surveys cover different subsets of countries,
the averaging process may introduce new measurement errors when cross-country rankings are
produced. One should  also  note that,  as the  TI  indexes in  different years  are  derived from
potentially different set of surveys, they should not be used to measure changes in corruption level
over time for a particular country.
As examples of the corruption ratings according to these sources, I reproduce below the BI,
TI and GCR indices for a subset of countries.  In the original indices, large numbers refer to low
corruption (e.g., the BI-index value for Singapore is 10). To avoid awkwardness in interpretation, I
re-scale all the indices in Table 1 so that low values imply low corruption (e.g., the re-scaled BI
index value for Singapore is 1).  To facilitate comparisons, I have rescaled the GCR ratings from
the original 1-7 range to 1-10 range in the table.
6Table 1: Corruption Ratings for Selected Countries
BI  T197  GCR97
Asian countries
Singapore  1  2.34  1.77
Hong Kong  3  3.72  2.17
Japan  2.25  4.43  2.96
Taiwan  4.25  5.98  4.60
Malaysia  5  5.99  5.67
S. Korea  5.25  6.71  6.20
Thailand  9.5  7.94  7.93
Philippines  6.5  7.95  7.94
China  n.a.  8.12  5.86
India  5.75  8.25  7.30
Indonesia  9.5  8.28  7.94
Pakistan  7  8.47  n.a.
Bangladesh  7  9.20  n.a.
Non-Asian countries
Canada  1  1.90  2.37
United Kingdom  1.75  2.72  1.93
Germany  1.5  2.77  2.61
United States  1  3.39  2.41
France  1  4.34  3.51
Mexico  7.75  8.34  6.24
Kenya  6.5  8.70  n.a.
Colombia  6.5  8.77  7.41
Russia  n.a.  8.73  7.61
Nigeria  8  9.24  n.a
Notes:  See the text immediately  preceding  the table for sources  on BI, TI and GCR indices.  In the original
BI, TI and GCR  indices,  small  numbers  imply  more  corruption.  All the indices  in the table  have been  re-
scaled  so  that large  numbers  imply  more  corruption.  For  BI and TI indices,  the values  in the  table = 11-
original  scores;  and for  the GCR  index,  the values  in the  table = 8-original  scores.  The GCR  ratings are
rescaled  from the original 1-7  range to 1-10  range.
7It  is  worthwhile to  emphasize again that  these  indices  reflect people's  self-reported
perception, as opposed to  objective measures of corruption.  Perception can be different from
reality.  However, two things  may be worth noting.  First, for  many questions such as  how
corruption affects foreign investment, perception -- and thus perhaps our measure -- could actually
matter.  Second, despite the very different sources of the surveys, the pairwise correlations among
the indices are very high.  For example, according to Wei (1997b), the correlation between the BI
and TI indices and that between BI and GCR indices are 0.88 and 0.77, respectively.  These high
correlations suggest that statistical inference on the consequences of corruption is not very sensitive
to the choice of corruption index.
2. Economic consequences
In this section, we review some recent studies that systematically  examine the consequences
of corruption on the economic development.  Wherever possible, I illustrate the results from these
studies using examples from Asian countries.
On domestic investment
A recent story in  China Youth Daily may be a representative case of how bureaucratic
corruption and extortion can kill a small business. 4 Huang Shengxin, a 36 year old fonner soldier
and recipient of a Class III military medal, was a private business owner in Guangxi Province's
Fangchenggang City in Southwestern China. When he left the army in 1982, he thought he would
go  into the  restaurant business.  Through his  and  his family's  long  hours of hard  work, his
4 Reproduced  in New World  Times, (in English,  circulated  in the Greater  Washington  DC area) April 24,
1998,  pl8, which attributed  it to Zhang  Shuangwu,  China  Youth Daily  without  giving  the original  date of
8"Changxin Restaurant" had  developed a  good  reputation and  even won an  official honorable
designation from the county government.  Huang himself was designated a National Outstanding
Private-Sector Worker in recognition of his success in business.
This was when the trouble began.  Bureaucrats and their relatives loved the restaurant.
They paid countless visits over the years, sometimes in the name of work inspection.  The problem
is that they did not pay the bills.  By Huang's account, by February 1997, the County Governnent
of Tanying, where the restaurant was located, owed him 80,665 Chinese yuans5 in unpaid bills. On
May 20, 1997, burdened by  his inability to return the restaurant to its profitable past, Huang sadly
folded "Changxin Restaurant."
Let us now turn to some statistical evidence based on the data on a large cross-section of
countries.  In a regression of total investment/GDP ratio, averaged over 1980-1985, on a constant
and the corruption index, the point estimate of the slope is 0.012 (Table IV, in Mauro, 1995, p696).
To illustrate the quantitative effect of corruption, let me do a sample calculation by taking literally
the point estimate and the corruption ratings. If Philippines could reduce its corruption level to the
Singapore level, other things being equal, it would have been able to raise its investment/GDP ratio
by 6.6 percentage points (=(6.5-1)XO.012).  This is quite a substantial increase inthe investment.
[When Mauro (1995) used linguistic and ethnic fractionalization  as an instrumental variable
for corruption in the above regression, he obtained an even larger point estimate on the effect of
corruption on investment/GDP ratio, about twice as large.]
On foreign direct investment
In  examining a  data set of bilateral foreign direct investment in the early  1990s from
fourteen major source countries to forty one host countries, Wei (1997) found clear evidence that
corruption in host countries discourages foreign investment (the coefficients on corruption and host
publication.
5 Just under US$10,000  at mid-September,  1998  exchange  rate of US$1 = 8.3 Chinese  yuans.
9country marginal tax rate are -0.09 and -1.92, respectively). Using the point estimates in the paper
and the BI-corruption ratings in Table 1, let me provide a sample calculation as an illustration.  If
India could reduce its  corruption level to  the Singapore level,  its effect  on  attracting foreign
investment would be the same as reducing its marginal corporate tax rate by 22 percentage points
[=(5.75-1)xO.09/(0.Olxl  .92)].
Many Asian countries offer substantial tax incentives  to lure multinational firms to locate in
their countries.  For example, China offers all foreign invested firms an initial two years of tax
holiday plus three subsequent years of half of the normal tax rate.  This research thus suggests that
these Asian countries would have attracted just as much or even more foreign investment without
any tax incentive if they could get domestic corruption under control.
In fact, Wei(1995) documented that, contrary to a cursory reading of the news, China is an
underachiever as a host of direct investment from five major source countries (the U.S., Japan,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and France), once one takes into account its size, proximity to
some major source countries and other factors. Wei(l 998) suggests that high corruption in China
may very well have contributed to this.
On economic growth
If corruption reduces domestic investment and reduces foreign investment, one would think
that it would also reduce the economic growth rate.  Mauro examined how the conditional growth
rate (that is, the growth rate given the country's  starting point and population size) is affected by
corruption. He found that the data reveals just that relationship..
To illustrate the quantitative effect, let me take the point estimate in Column 6, Table VII of
his paper.  If Bangladesh were able to reduce its corruption to the Singapore level, its average
annual per capita GDP growth rate over 1960-1985, would have been higher by  1.8 percentage
points (=0.003x(7-1)).  Assuming its actual average growth rate was 4% a year, its per capita
10income by 1985 could have been more than 50% higher. 6
Using an instrumental variable approach, such as in Column 8 in  Table VII of Mauro's
paper, one would  get even larger effect  of corruption on  growth, though  the result becomes
borderline significant at the 15% level.
On the size and composition of government expenditure
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) carried out a  systematic study on the effect of corruption on
government's  public  finance.  There are several important findings.  (A) Corruption tends  to
increase the size of public investment (at the expense of private investment among other things)
because many items in public expenditure lend themselves to manipulations by high level officials
to  get bribes. (B) Corruption skews the composition of public expenditure away from needed
operation and maintenance towards expenditure on new equipment (see also Klitgaard, 1990, for
this point). (C) Corruption skews the composition of public expenditure away from needed health
and education funds, because these expenditures, relative to other public projects, are less easy for
officials to extract rents from.  (D) Corruption reduces the productivity of public investment and of
a country's  infrastructure. (E) Corruption may reduce tax revenue because it compromises the
government's ability to collect taxes and tariffs, though the net effect depends on how the nominal
tax rate and other regulatory burdens were chosen by corruption-prone officials (see Kaufmann and
Wei, 1998).
Similarly, Mauro (1997) found that corruption tends to skew public expenditure away from
health and education, presumably because they are more difficult to manipulate for bribe purposes
than are other projects.
Let me illustrate some of the Tanzi-Davoodi findings by looking at the effect of a change in
corruption on a variety of indicators, averaged over 1980-95.  An increase in corruption from the
Singapore level  to  Pakistan  level  would  increase  the  public  expenditure/GDP ratio  by  1.6
6 (1+0.018/1.04)25  - 1 = 0.54. Lower assumption  on its actual  growth  rate (say  3% a year)  would result
in even greater improvement  in 1985  per capita income  from reducing  its corruption  level.
11percentage points (Column 2 of Tanzi-Davoodi's Table 1); and reduce government revenue/GDP
ratio by 10 percentage points (Column 2 of Tanzi-Davoodi's Table 2).
An increase in corruption reduces the quality of roads, and increases incidence of power
outages, telecommunication faults, and water losses.  Specifically, an increase in corruption from
the Singapore level to the Pakistan level would be associated with an extra 15 percent increase of
roads  in  bad  condition, after controlling for a  country's  level  of  development and  its  public
investment to GDP ratio (Column 2 in Table 5).
On labor movement
Our discussion so far has been focused on  bureaucratic corruption - bribes  paid to  or
extorted by public officials.  This is deliberate.  But I want to note briefly that corruption is
certainly not restricted to this type only.  Corruption between private parties is also widespread in
many countries, with serious consequences. I will use some space here to discuss its manifestation
in labor union activities.
Bribe payment to supposed agents of a labor union can compromise the collective interest
of the union. The case of meat cutters in New York City in the 1  970s helps to illustrate this point.7
The supermarkets in New York had to deal with a well-organized labor union, the Amalgamated
Meat Cutters and Retail Food Stores Employees Union, which basically had monopoly over the
local labor supply.  The supermarkets were reported to make regular payments to a middleman,
who in turn paid union officials to buy labor peace.  One large Midwest beef processor paid large
sums to this individual (and hence the union officials indirectly), which helped the firm to do much
of the meat cutting in the Midwest (at the expense of New York meat cutters) without encountering
labor unrest in New York.  In the process, the middleman and a  few labor union officials had
profited, but the majority of the New York labor union members didn't.  While this is a U.S.
7 This case is taken from Rose-Ackerman  (1978,  p195),  who attributed  the original source  of the story to
The  Wall Street Journal,  September  10, 11, 1974;  and New  York Times,  March 14, 26 and October  8,
1974.
12example, one can imagine that similar cases may have happened in labor unions elsewhere.
Recent revelations of corruption and fraud in the election of Teamsters Union officials in
the  U.S.  further tarnished  its  reputation (which  was still painfully  recovering from  its  early
unfavorable image of mob connections), and this dealt a serious blow to the effectiveness of the
union.
On urban bias, poverty and other consequences
The desire to extract bribes distorts the behavior in a variety of ways.  In particular, less
"manipulatable" public projects often do not get into the budget adequately, even if they have high
social value.  Large scale defense projects are often favored by politicians and bureaucrats because
their size and secrecy are often conducive to kickbacks. 8
Defense contracts are often budgeted at the expense of rural health clinics specializing in
preventive care (Gray and Kaufmnann,  1998). To the extent that rural residents tend to have lower
incomes than their urban counterparts, this corruption-induced policy bias may worsen the income
distribution, and at the same time, divert the needed resources away from the countryside.
The last example shows that poverty can be made worse and more persistent by corruption.
In fact, one can expect that corruption would make poverty worse in cities as well as in rural areas,
as poor people  have less means to  bribe officials and less political  power  in  general. Rose-
Ackerman (1997) listed several channels through which poor people are hurt by corruption. (A)
The poor will receive a lower level of social services. (B) Infrastructure investment will be biased
against projects that aid the poor. (C) The poor may face higher tax or fewer services. (D) The poor
are disadvantaged in selling their agricultural produce. And (E) their ability to  escape proverty
using indigenous, small scale enterprise is diminished.
8 At the writing of this paper (April 1998),  a Taiwanese  general  in charge  of procurement  is under
investigation  for vastly overpaying  for a French-made  warship  in exchange  for huge bribes. Similarly,
India's arms purchase  from Sweden  gave  birth  to one of the most spectacular  corruption  scandals  in both
countries' national  politics.
13Using cross-country regressions over the period 1980-97, Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-
Terme (1998) show that high and rising corruption, as measured by the ICRG index, increases
income inequality and poverty. Several channels have been identified in the paper through which
corruption worsens the (relative and sometimes absolute) poverty: corruption lowers economic
growth, biases the tax system to favor the rich and well-connected, reduces the effectiveness of
targeting of  social programs, biases  government policies towards favoring inequality in  asset
ownership, lowers social spending, reduces access to education by the poor, and, increases the risk
of investment by the poor.
Does Corruption 'Grease' the Wheels of Commerce?
While  the  previous  evidence has  clearly  showed that  domestic  investment,  foreign
investment and economic growth are lower in more corrupt countries, one sometimes still hears a
version of "virtuous bribery" story. In particular, some say that bribes often work as "grease" that
can speed of wheels of commerce.  In a country that is rife with bad and heavy regulations, the
opportunity to offer bribes to circumvent bad government control is like deregulation, and hence
can be good.
Kaufmann and Wei (1998) argues that this view is true only in a very narrow sense when
the bad regulation and official harassment are taken as exogenous.  Officials often have lots of
leeway to customize the type and amount of harassment on individual firms.  Tax inspectors may
have room to over-report taxable income (see Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo, 1998). Fire inspectors
can decide how frequently they need to come back to check fire safety in a given year.  Using data
on a survey of nearly 2400 firms in 58 countries, Kaufmann and Wei show that, even within a
country, managers of the firms that pay more bribes on average spend more rather than less time
negotiating with government officials.  It is likely that there was, on average, a disadvantage to
those paying bribes as well as to the society in general. This evidence supports the idea of "tailored
harrassment" and "endogenous obstacles," and thus rejects the hypothesis of exogenous obstacles
and beneficial "grease."
143. Culture: Is Asia Special?
Denis  Osborne's  (1997)  paper  documents clearly the  possible  differences  in  attitude
towards corruption and bribery in different countries and times.  Tanzi (1995) argued that firms in
some countries are culturally less inclined to have arms-length economic relationships, which in
turn may lead to more ingrained corruption.
While there is ample evidence that different people may have different views with respect to
bribes versus gifts, 9 or group loyalty versus self-interest,  Osborne also observed that many of these
differences may not be inherently cultural. For example, seemingly greater tolerance of bribes in
some communities may be a result of the short horizons of the official due to uncertainty about the
future in a time of rapid change, or pitifully low salaries of civil servants that are regarded by the
officials or ordinary citizens on the street as "unfair" (Osborne, 1997, P22).  These should not be
properly defined as "cultural." Furthermore, Osborne documented that throughout human history,
from ancient Greece, William Shakesphere in the West, to Confucianism and Hinduism in the East,
one can find repeated expressions of distaste by scholars and ordinary people for corruption and
dishonesty.
We do not have enough good, detailed country studies on the interaction among culture,
corruption and economic development.  Pasuk Phongpaichi and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan's book,
Corruption and Democracy in Thailand, bravely as well as brilliantly offers an in-depth study of
corruption in Thailand. At the beginning of the book, the authors reviewed many early studies of
the subject, many of which attribute Thai corruption to cultural heritage (see their description of the
work by Lucien Hanks (1982), Fred Riggs (1966), Edward Van Roy(1970), Thinapan Nakata
(1977), and Clard Neher (1977).  With a large-scale survey, the Pasuk-Sungsidh book concludes
that Thai people do have a higher limit than those in many other countries on the amount of money
9 See also Rose-Ackerman  (1998a)  for an illuminating  discussion  of bribes versus  gifts.
15officials may take from the private sector before it is considered corruption.
In the previous section, we cited evidence that foreign investors on average invest less in
more corrupt countries.  Some may suspect that East Asia must be an outlier since it seems such a
popular destination for foreign investment.  Let us note here that, yes, foreign investment in East
Asia has been big, but East Asia is a large market and has been growing faster than the world
average.  Many East Asian countries also have low wages.  On these factors alone, East Asia
naturally attracts more foreign investment.  To see whether foreign investors are less sensitive to
corruption in Asian host countries, one needs to control for these factors.  A section in Wei (1997)
did exactly that.  The evidence shows that there  is no  support for the Asian  exceptionalism
hypothesis.  Instead, investors from the major source countries are just as averse to corruption in
East Asia as elsewhere. Putting  it differently, among East Asian host countries, foreign investors
still prefer to go to less corrupt countries other things being equal.  One should note that the paper
does not compare whether domestic and foreign investors may have different degrees of sensitivity
to corruption.
4. Effective ways to fight corruption
Because corruption is a crime in most countries' penal codes, it is common to emphasize the
role of law enforcement in the fight against corruption. While there is no question that law and law
enforcement are important, we should note that it is at least as important to look into the root causes
of corruption, the institutional environment and the incentive structure under which  corruption
thrives.
Several important theoretic works  (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Tanzi,  1998; etc) have
pointed out factors that affect a country's level of corruption. I will first review these factors from
the theoretical viewpoints and summarize recent empirical attempts at testing and quantifying the
roles of these factors.
16A. Opportunities induced by Government's Role in the Economy
While we want to recruit ethical individuals to become government officials, economists are
never tired of pointing out the importance of minimizing the  institutionalized opportunity for
officials to  take bribes.  The more discretion government officials have over the  operation of
business or lives of citizenry, the more likely corruption would occur and flourish, other things
being equal. Labyrinthine government regulations create fertile grounds for government officials to
extract rents, whereas an  economy where government's role is minimal is less likely to breed
corruption.
This point is almost elementary. If it requires obtaining a  license and paying a tariff before
a firm can import certain goods, then officials deciding who gets a license and granting tariff
exemptions have the opportunity to extract bribe payments. If no license or tariff is needed, no firm
would pay bribes before importing.
Tanzi's  excellent  survey  (1998)  offers  a  number  of  concrete  descriptions  of  where
opportunity for corruption may arise as a result of government (over-)regulation. For example, in
the taxation area, he pointed out that the more difficult it is to understand the laws, the more likely
there  is  corruption; the more  discretion given to  tax  administrators over the  granting  of tax
incentives, determining tax liabilities, and selecting audits and litigations, the more likely there is
corruption.
Similarly, the  size  of  government spending and  the procedure  used  in  allocating  the
expenditure also significantly affects the opportunity for corruption.  Also, if a  government is
involved in providing certain goods and services at subsidized prices, say foreign exchange, credit,
public housing, educational opportunities, or water and electricity, then officials with the duty to
decide also have the opportunity to pocket a fraction of the implicit subsidy (e.g. the difference
between the market value of the goods or services and the price the government is asking), in the
form of bribes extracted from the recipient of the subsidized goods or services.
In the papers both by Mauro (1995) and by Kaufmann and Wei (1998), it is shown that the
corruption index and the index of government regulation is positively correlated.
17Many countries in Asia have been pursuing active industrial policies.  Industrial policies by
their very nature involve discretion on the part of governnent officials, in terms of which industry
to support, which firms within an industry to support, how to allocate subsidized loans, grants, tariff
rebates, and so on.  Ades and Di Tella (1997) argue that, logically, industrial policies can promote
corruption as well as investment. Using data on indices of corruption and industrial policy across a
number of countries, they then show that corruption is indeed higher in countries with more active
industrial policy.  The negative effect of corruption induced by the industrial policy seems large
(probably on the order of 56% to 84% of the direct beneficial effect), and therefore should not be
neglected in any cost-benefit analysis of industrial policies.
Before leaving this  subsection, it should be pointed out  that,  while less discretion by
government officials reduces the scope for corruption, we are not advocating abolishing all the
regulations. Many regulations and even bureaucratic discretion serve useful functions in the society.
The point is rather that we should be mindful of the implications for corruption when designing
government regulations.
B. Civil servant recruitment and promotion system
The  moral  character  and  quality  of  government  officials  are  certainly  another  very
important determinant of the extent of corruption in a country.  The quality of the bureaucrats, in
turn, is highly related to how they are recruited, paid, and promoted.  In a country where nepotism
and patronage are rampant, or government posts are sold explicitly or implicitly, bureaucrats will be
less  competent  and  less  well-motivated because  success depends  on  advantages  gained  by
connection or bribing superiors rather than merit, and will be very vulnerable to corruption.  The
German sociologist Max Weber (1947) made this point amply clear.
Rauch  and Evans  (1997) composed indices of  degree of  meritocratic recruitment and
promotion for civil servants in 35 countries (as well as their average wages relative to private sector
alternatives). They then show that the cross-country ratings such as the International Country Risk
Guide are statistically significantly related to the way civil servants are recruited and promoted.
18Meritocratic recruitment is  most  important for  reducing corruption, followed by  meritocratic
promotion and security of employment.
C. Compensation for civil servants
It has been long recognized that it is naive to give people power, pay them a pitiful wage,
and expect them not to use their power for personal gains.  Because of this realization, Singapore,
starting in the 1960s under the leadership of then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, and Hong Kong,
starting in the  late  1970s, began to  pay their civil  servants well,  sometimes above their best
alternative in the private sector. For example, it is often noted, fondly or not, that the Singapore's
cabinet ministers' salaries are pegged to those of the CEOs in the largest multinational firms in the
world.  The Singapore Prime Minister's pay is several times that of the United States President.
Many scholars (and the governments in Singapore and Hong Kong) contend that this wage policy is
in an  important way responsible for the very low corruption levels in  these two  economies.
[Singapore is often rated as one of the least corrupt countries in many surveys.]
The  view that  high  salaries to  civil servants help to  deter  corruption is certainly  not
restricted to Asia.  For example, according to Tanzi (1998), Assar Lindbeck (1998) attributes the
low corruption in Sweden during the 1870-1970  period partly to the fact that high-level government
administrators eamed 12-15 times the salary of an average industrial worker.
Systematic  and  statistical  examination  of  the  evidence  on  the  connection  between
corruption and public sector wage is a relatively recent undertaking.  In a cross-country regression
study cited above, Rauch and Evans (1997) did not find robust support for the role of high salaries.
But  the  World  Bank's  World  Development Report  1997  and  the  working  paper  by  Van
Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) do report evidence that countries with poorly paid public officials
tend towards higher corruption.
What is important here is not the absolute level of civil servants' wages, but their values
relative to the best private sector alternatives.  In Van Rijckeghem and Weder's paper, given the
constraint  of  data  availability, they  take  the  average  civil  servant pay  relative  to  average
19manufacturing sector wage, as their measure of officials' incentive to resist corruption.
Using a regression technique, they found a negative and statistically significant correlation
between public sector's relative wages and the extent of corruption involving government officials.
Based on their point estimates, they also calculated, for each country in their sample, the ratio of
public to private sector wages that is needed in a literal calibration of their regression in order to
reduce the corruption to  Singapore level, which has the lowest corruption grade (this is called
"calibrated ratio to reduce corruption to Singapore  level" below). It maybe instructive to reproduce
the part of their Table 6 below that reports the actual versus the calibrated ratios for the Asian and
other selected countries in the sample.  Like all other projections in this paper, the numbers below
are meant to be illustrative and not to be taken literally.
20Table 2: How Much Increase in Civil Servants' Legal Pay Is Needed
if one takes Van Rijckeghem -Weder (1997) calculation literally?
Country  Public Sector relative to Manufacturing Sector Wage
Actual  Calibrated ratio to  Needed increase in
reduce corruption to  Public Sector's Legal
Singapore level  Pay by taking van Rijckeghem-
Weder literally
(1)  (2)  (3)
Asian Countries
Singapore  3.49  3.49  0%
Hong Kong  1.79  2.85  59%
India  1.09  5.40  395%
Korea  1.91  7.08  271%
Sri Lanka  0.85  5.07  496%
Non-Asian Developing Countries
Mexico  0.50  5.04  908%
Turkey  0.92  5.38  498%
Colombia  0.64  4.87  660%
Kenya  0.90  5.36  496%
Ghana  0.63  6.77  975%
Source: The first two columns are from Table 6 in Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997). Column (3)
is author's calculation based on the first two columns.
A few things are particulary worth noting in the table.  First, to really eradicate corruption
(or to reduce it to the Singapore level), one needs to raise the public sector's pay by a substantial
margin  (sometimes by  500%  or  even  900%).  Although  government  officials  in  Asia  are
comparatively better-paid than some of their African and Latin American counterpart and hence a
smaller increase is needed, the 60%, 200% to  500% increase may be still fiscally infeasible for
these countries.  Second, we do not know for sure if the warranted salary increase should raise the
21pay to the government officials above their private sector alternatives. 10 If they do, there is a
serious equity issue even if these governments have the money (or have the ability to transform
most of the currently illegal bribes to the incremental taxes needed to raise the civil servants' legal
pay). Third, if civil servants are paid a higher salary than their private sector alternatives, many
people may pay a bribe to be chosen for these public jobs. So the high pay policy itself may create
new type of corruption. Fourth, extortion and bribe-taking practices could have become part of the
bureaucrats'  work culture and habit, so that increased legal pay  may not  do  much to  reduce
corruption, at least initially.
Fortunately, one need not draw such a pessimistic conclusion from this exercise if  one
realizes that the public sector wage is but  one of the elements in  a successful anti-corruption
campaign. We now turn to another important component below.
D. Legal system, "watch-dog" organization,  "hot-line," client surveys, free press and democracy.
In any fight against corruption, the ability for a country to detect acts of corruption and to
prosecute those guilty of committing them is essential to deter corruption.
There are several channels through which detection and punishment capacity is realized.
Let me mention seven of them here: (A) An independent and impartial judicial  system, (B) an
official anti-corruption agency such as Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC), 11 (C) existence of grassroots "watchdog" organizations, (D) a telephone "hot line" as
those  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  Mexico that  allow  citizens  to  complain  directly  to  the
government, (E) public opinion surveys such as those carried out  by Public Affairs Center in
10  One should  note that the true private sector  alternatives  for senior  government  officials  with
comparable  skills and responsibilities  are likely  paid a lot more  than the average  wage in the
manufacturing  sector.  But the manufacturing  sector  wage is the only wage data available  on a consistent
cross-country  basis. The assumption  in the study is that, across  countries,  the manufacturing  wage and
the salaries  of the private sector  alternative  of government  officials are  highly positively  correlated.
11 See Quah  (1989 and 1993)  for a discussion  of Hong  Kong  and Singapore's  anti-corruption  measures
along this and other lines.
22Banglore, India or by the World Bank's Economic Development Institute in other countries that
register the public's attitude, particularly those of the poor, towards corruption, (F) freedom of the
press to bring to  light any official corruption, and  finally (G) democracy that serves the dual
purpose of throwing corrupt officials out of power by the populace and protecting those individuals
and organizations that  dare to  expose corrupt officials.  All of these channels are potentially
important.  There are some case studies and much anecdotal evidence that demonstrate both
effectiveness in specific countries and time periods, and suggestions on how to implement them.  It
seems possible that the extra revenue collected by the government as a result of the actions of the
various anti-corruption bodies can exceed the cost of these bodies.
While the intuition for the importance of these channels seems straightforward, so far there
is very  little systematic statistical analysis of their  relative importance for a  broad  sample of
countries. Such will be a very fruitful future research topic.
E. International Pressure
There are two kinds of international pressure that can be brought to bear on the corruption
problem.  First, international organizations such as the United Nations Development Program, the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, and the like, can
provide moral suasion, pressure as well as technical assistance 12 to induce or help countries in their
fight against corruption. Various conferences on good governance and corruption organized by the
UNDP, the World Bank and so on are useful.  Cutting off loans or threatening to cut off loans by
the IMF or World Bank on the ground of corruption in recipient countries may be even more
effective on the margin in some cases.  13
The second channel is concerted international effort to criminalize the offering of bribes by
multinational firms to host countries' officials.  Until December 1997, the United States has been
12 Proper  procurement  guidelines  are an example  of this.
13 There is little data on this, perhaps  because  the battles are often not fought in the open.
23the only major source country of international direct investment that has an enforced law -- The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 -- that prohibits its companies from bribing foreign
officials.  For most other major source countries in the OECD, not only has it been not illegal to
bribe foreign officials, but bribes have been, up until very recently, tax-deductible. 14 The U.S. law
has not been very effective in reducing corruption in foreign countries, perhaps because companies
from other countries are too eager to pick up the business that the U.S. firms miss due to the law. 1 5
Thus, corruption-prone foreign officials do not feel enough pressure to change their behavior even
if  they  are  genuinely  interested in  attracting  foreign  investment  into  their  countries.  An
international treaty that bans loreign corruption can strengthen the collective ability of all major
multinational firms not to pay bribes.  They would be more likely to resist demands for bribes if
they can be confident that they will not lose business to their competitors as a result.
It  should be pointed out that we should not have any romantic hope on the degree of
effectiveness of international pressure. First, the mandates of almost all international governmental
organizations place  some lim.its on how much anti-corruption objective can be pursued in the
organizations' activities.  If the World Bank were to  suspend lending to  countries with severe
corruption ratings according to the Transparency International, it would have to stop half or more of
its loans.  This would confliclt  with the survival tendencies of the organizations, and contradict its
other very important objectives, even though these objectives themselves may be jeopardized by
corruption.
Second,  and  more  importantly, domestic  efforts  and  domestic  institutions  ultimately
determine the success in reducing corruption.  If government officials do not intend to seriously
14 Britain  has a 1906  (?) law that can  be interpreted  as prohibiting  its firms from bribing  foreign  officials.
But it is effectively  unenforced..
15 Hines (1995)  found  that the U.S. firms do invest less in more corrupt  countries. Wei (1997a)  found
that U.S. firms are not very different  from those from other  OECD  source  countries  in this regard,  and
hence, U.S. firms' behavior  may  not be attiributable  to the FCPA. A Wall Street Journal  article
(September  29, 1995),  "Greasing  Wheels:  How U.S. Concerns  Compete  in Countries  where  Bribes
Flourish?" suggests  that some  firms may indeed  evade  the requirement  of law.
24reduce corruption, they would simply not request a loan if the international organization requires
corruption reduction as a prerequisite.
So while the international pressure is useful and should be applied whenever and wherever
possible, it should be regarded as supplemental to other domestically-based  reforms.
5. Concluding remarks
While one may think of examples in which some firms/people are made better off either by
paying a bribe or the opportunity to pay  a bribe, the overall effect of corruption on economic
development is negative. This is just as true in Asia as elsewhere.
Systematic research conducted recently by a number of authors find that the more corrupt a
country, the  slower it  grows.  There are  several channels through  which  corruption hinders
economic  development.  They  include  reduced  domestic  investment, reduced  foreign  direct
investment, overblown government expenditure, distorted composition of government expenditure
away from education, health, and the maintenance of infrastructure, towards less efficient public
projects that have more scope for manipulation and bribe-taking opportunities.
While culture plays a role in  determining what is considered a bribe versus a gift, the
culture-induced difference seems small. There is no evidence to support the notion that corruption
in Asia, East Asia included, is any less harmful than corruption elsewhere.
The fight against corruption has to be multi-fronted.  While laws and law enforcement are
indispensable, countries serious about fighting corruption should also pay attention to reforming
the role of govemnment  in the economy, particularly those areas that give officials discretionary
power which are hot beds for corruption. Recruiting and promoting civil servants on a merit basis,
and paying them a salary competitive to private sector alternatives help to  attract high quality,
moral civil servants.  International pressure on corrupt countries, including criminalizing bribing
foreign officials by multinational firms, is useful.  But the success of any anti-corruption campaign
25ultimately depends on the reform of domestic institutions in currently corrupt countries.
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